# Permit Trading Homework Hints Environmental Economics 

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The market has the same number of odd and even firms. Thus, we can simplify things by analyzing the case with one odd and one even firm.

## 1 Short-cut computation of market-clearing permit price

Assume that you know the output of Firm 1, $Q_{1}$, and Firm 2, $Q_{2}$. This will allow you to compute the total amount of abatement $A$ that will be required to support this level of output. Remember to subtract the total number of permits available from the total output $Q=Q_{1}+Q_{2}$ when computing total abatement. Market clearing requires

$$
\begin{equation*}
A_{1}+A_{2}=A \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

The fact that successful trading will equate marginal abatement costs gives the equation

$$
\begin{equation*}
6 A_{1}=2 A_{2} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

$A_{1}$ and $A_{2}$ can be determined from Equations 1 and 2.
Each firm will choose to abate until the marginal abatement cost equals the price of the permits. Letting $P$ denote the permit price, that means

$$
P=6 A_{1}=2 A_{2} .
$$

Now you must check to see if the two firms will desire to produce the quantities $Q_{1}$ and $Q_{2}$ that you guessed given that the permit price is $P$. If not, you will have to guess and try again.

One way to check is as follows. For Firm $i$ to increase output by one unit, the marginal cost will be $1+P$, which is the marginal cost of production plus the marginal cost of a permit. If $1+P$ is less than the selling price of 40 and $Q_{i}<20$ then the firm will want to increase output so you should add one to $Q_{i}$ and try again. If $1+P$ is greater than 40 you need to subtract one from $Q_{i}$ and try again.

## 2 Text-book computation of market-clearing permit price

Permit variables:
$P$ is permit price.
$X$ is permit quantity.
We will assume that Firm 2 sells to Firm 1 because Firm 2 has the lower marginal cost. If this assumption is wrong, $X$ below will be negative, which means Firm 1 sells permits to Firm 2.

Bounds:
$-10 \leq X \leq 10$
$0 \leq P \leq 39$
$0 \leq Q_{1} \leq 20$
$0 \leq Q_{2} \leq 20$
Profits for Firm 1 are revenues - cost - permit purchases - abatment. Abatement for Firm 1 is $Q_{1}-10-X$. Profits for Firm 2 are revenues - cost + permit sales - abatement. Abatement for Firm 2 is $Q_{2}-10+X$. Therefore the profit functions are
$\Pi_{1}=40 Q_{1}-Q_{1}-P X-3\left(Q_{1}-10-X\right)^{2}$
$\Pi_{2}=40 Q_{2}-Q_{2}+P X-\left(Q_{2}-10+X\right)^{2}$

Permit quantity first order conditions given $Q_{1}$ and $Q_{2}$ :
Firm 1's FOC: $\frac{d}{d X}\left[39 Q_{1}-P X-3\left(Q_{1}-10-X\right)^{2}\right]=0$
Firm 2's FOC: $\frac{d}{d X}\left[39 Q_{2}+P X-\left(Q_{2}-10+X\right)^{2}\right]=0$
or
Firm 1's FOC: $-P-6\left(Q_{1}-10-X\right)(-1)=0$
Firm 2's FOC: $P-2\left(Q_{2}-10+X\right)(+1)=0$
or
Firm 1's FOC: $P=6 Q_{1}-60-6 X$
Firm 2's FOC: $P=2 Q_{2}-20+2 X$
Equilibrium:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
P\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)=\left(3 Q_{1}+3 Q_{2}-60\right) / 2 & 0 \leq P \leq 39 \\
X\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)=\left(3 Q_{1}-Q_{2}-20\right) / 4 & -10 \leq X \leq 10
\end{array}
$$

Derivatives:
$\frac{d P}{d Q_{1}}=\frac{3}{2}$
$\frac{d P}{d Q_{2}}=\frac{3}{2}$
$\frac{d X}{d Q_{1}}=\frac{3}{4}$
$\frac{d X}{d Q_{2}}=-\frac{1}{4}$
Product quantity first order conditions given $P\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)$ and $X\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)$ :
Firm 1's FOC: $\left.\frac{d}{d Q_{1}}\left\{39 Q_{1}-X\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right) P\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)\right]-3\left[Q_{1}-10-X\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)\right]^{2}\right\}=0$
Firm 2's FOC: $\left.\frac{d}{d Q_{2}}\left\{39 Q_{2}+X\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right) P\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)\right]-\left[Q_{1}-10+X\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)\right]^{2}\right\}=0$ or

Firm 1's FOC: $39-\frac{d P}{d Q_{1}} X-P \frac{d X}{d Q_{1}}-6\left(Q_{1}-10-X\right)\left(1-\frac{d X}{d Q_{1}}\right)=0$
Firm 2's FOC: $39+\frac{d P}{d Q_{2}} X+P \frac{d X}{d Q_{2}}-2\left(Q_{2}-10+X\right)\left(1+\frac{d X}{d Q_{2}}\right)=0$
or
Firm 1's FOC: $39-\frac{3}{2} X-\frac{3}{4} P-6\left(Q_{1}-10-X\right)\left(1-\frac{3}{4}\right)=0$
Firm 2's FOC: $39+\frac{3}{2} X-\frac{1}{4} P-2\left(Q_{2}-10+X\right)\left(1-\frac{1}{4}\right)=0$
Equilibrium:
$Q_{1}=36-\frac{1}{2} P\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)$
$Q_{2}=36-\frac{1}{6} P\left(Q_{1}, Q_{2}\right)$
If $Q_{1}$ exceeds 20 , round down to 20 . Similarly for $Q_{2}$.

## 3 Justification of the short-cut computation of the market-clearing permit price

The abatement that each firm does is
$A_{1}=Q_{1}-10-X$
$A_{2}=Q_{2}-10+X$
If we add these two eqations we get the total abatement required
$A=A_{1}+A_{2}=Q_{1}+Q_{2}-20$.
From the permit quantity first order conditions given $Q_{1}$ and $Q_{2}$ we have
$P=6\left(Q_{1}-10-X\right)=6 A_{1}$
$P=2\left(Q_{2}-10+X\right)=2 A_{2}$
from which we get abatement marginals are equated $P=6 A_{1}=2 A_{2}$.

